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As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis
in Ukraine is “the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.”
It is somewhat ironic that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding
the planned signature of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create
a zone of stability, prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises
the need for self-reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate
the limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy? And, how can the EU play a
constructive role to solve the crisis?
Looking back: deficiencies of the European
Neighbourhood Policy
In light of the current crisis it is an interesting exercise to retrace the first ideas and
proposals on what gradually developed as the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Very relevant is a non-paper on ‘Wider Europe’, jointly written by – at that time
– external relations Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Javier
Solano in August 2002. In this document, the authors observed that redefining
the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours constitutes “the most immediate
challenge” of the new policy. Significantly, they also devoted attention to the Russian
Federation: “The EU’s dialogue and co-operation with Russia on specific challenges
emanating from, or relating to, the other countries of the region are crucial to
chances of solving them.”
However, such dialogue never really materialised. The ENP developed separately
from the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership and largely copied the methodology and
rationale of the EU’s enlargement policy be it without the carrot of accession. The
Russian-Georgian military conflict of August 2008 was a first warning that simply
extending the EU’s norms and values to the Eastern ENP countries is not sufficient
to stabilise the region. An extraordinary European Council meeting organised
in September 2008 strongly condemned Russia’s actions and accelerated the
preparations for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) including relations with Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Caucasus countries. The conclusion of a new
generation of Association Agreements including provisions on the establishment of
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) is at the centre of this policy.
From the outset, Russia’s perception of the EaP has been very negative. The
experience of ‘colour revolutions’ in its direct vicinity as well as the elaboration
of this new policy in the wake of the Georgia crisis explain Moscow’s scepticism.
Russian concerns about the economic and political consequences of the EaP have
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always been countered by the official EU position that the EaP is a positive project
promoting prosperity and stability in Europe, and as such also in the interest of
Russia. Whereas this approach may sound attractive, it basically conceals the
lack of a comprehensive EU strategy for the entire region. Arguably, this is partly
related to the EU’s constitutional complexity which almost unavoidably reduces any
strategic foreign policy to the lowest common denominator. In such a context, path-
dependency is the easiest option. The construction of the ENP is a perfect example
of such an approach.
Looking forward: an EU role in solving the conflict?
The EU’s institutional set-up also makes it rather difficult to quickly and decisively
respond to an unfolding crisis. Despite the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and
the ambition to reinvigorate the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
every international crisis reveals the limits of the existing structures. The political
compromise of 21 February 2014, which made an end to violence on Maidan, was
brokered by the foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany. The constitutional
basis for their action as representatives of the EU is somewhat obscure. According
to the Treaties, the EU’s external representation in the field of CFSP belongs to
the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Arts. 15 and 18 TFEU). What appeared to
become a success story for EU diplomatic mediation soon received a major blow
when the political compromise was blown up at Maidan, President Yanukovich fled
and Vladimir Putin launched its operation in the Crimea.
From the perspective of the EU, it is rather painful that the last attempt to find a
political way out of the crisis before the Crimea referendum was a bilateral meeting
between American Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov. One could have expected to see the EU’s High Representative
around the table. It is also unfortunate that European Council President Van
Rompuy cancelled a high-level meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin
on 19 March 2014, officially because the secret visit was leaked but according
to certain sources because not all EU Member States supported his initiative. Be
that as it may, the reality is that the EU’s CFSP is Member State-driven. Finding a
common position in response to international crisis situations is not an easy task
in a Union of 28 Member States with divergent interests and ambitions. The crisis
in Ukraine is yet another litmus test for the credibility of the EU’s external action.
Only if the EU Member States can avoid open disagreements in responding to
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and, even more important, if the EU can play
a decisive role in brokering an exit strategy to avoid a further escalation it can
legitimately claim to be a significant global actor. As NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis in Ukraine is “the gravest
threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.” It is somewhat ironic
that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding the planned signature
of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create a zone of stability,
prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises the need for self-
reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate the limits of the
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proposals on what gradually developed as the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Very relevant is a non-paper on ‘Wider Europe’, jointly written by – at that time
– external relations Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Javier
Solano in August 2002. In this document, the authors observed that redefining
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every international crisis reveals the limits of the existing structures. The political
compromise of 21 February 2014, which made an end to violence on Maidan, was
brokered by the foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany. The constitutional
basis for their action as representatives of the EU is somewhat obscure. According
to the Treaties, the EU’s external representation in the field of CFSP belongs to
the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Arts. 15 and 18 TFEU). What appeared to
become a success story for EU diplomatic mediation soon received a major blow
when the political compromise was blown up at Maidan, President Yanukovich fled
and Vladimir Putin launched its operation in the Crimea.
From the perspective of the EU, it is rather painful that the last attempt to find a
political way out of the crisis before the Crimea referendum was a bilateral meeting
between American Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov. One could have expected to see the EU’s High Representative
around the table. It is also unfortunate that European Council President Van Rompuy
cancelled a high-level meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 19 March
2014, officially because the secret visit was leaked but according to certain sources
because not all EU Member States supported his initiative. Be that as it may, the
reality is that the EU’s CFSP is Member State-driven. Finding a common position
in response to international crisis situations is not an easy task in a Union of 28
Member States with divergent interests and ambitions. The crisis in Ukraine is yet
another litmus test for the credibility of the EU’s external action. Only if the EU
Member States can avoid open disagreements in responding to Russia’s annexation
of the Crimea and, even more important, if the EU can play a decisive role in
brokering an exit strategy to avoid a further escalation it can legitimately claim to be
a significant global actor.
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